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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has held that legislative district-drawing merits 
strict scrutiny when based predominantly on race.1 In Bethune-Hill v. 
Virginia Board of Elections,2 the Supreme Court had to decide whether 
twelve Virginia challenged legislative districts, in which a one-size-fits-
all 55% black voting age population (“BVAP”) floor was imposed, 
withstood constitutional scrutiny. In particular, it had to decide whether 
the court below erred in: (1) concluding that the admitted use of the 
BVAP percentage to draw the challenged districts does not amount to 
racial predominance; (2) employing a standard for racial predominance 
that requires the use of race result in “actual conflict” with traditional 
districting criteria; and (3) concluding that the Virginia legislature’s 
predominant use of race in drawing House District 75, a district in 
question, satisfies strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.3 The Court ultimately held that the 
district court incorrectly applied the predominance test, but declined to 
hold that race predominated in the eleven districts, instead remanding 
the case to the district court for reexamination.4 The Court also 
affirmed the district court’s ruling on House District 75.5 
This commentary will argue that the stated prioritization of the 
55% BVAP percentage above all other criteria in the redistricting 
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1.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995).
2.  137 S. Ct. 788, 800 (2017). 
3.  Question Presented Report, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 136 S. Ct. 2406,
No. 15-680 (2016). 
4.  Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct at 800.
5.  Id. at 800–01.
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process, satisfies the predominance test set forth by the Court in Miller 
v. Johnson.6 Accordingly, the Court should have held that race 
predominated in the formation of all twelve challenged districts, and 
remanded the case to the district court solely for strict scrutiny analysis 
on the eleven districts apart from House District 75. The Court should 
also have vacated the lower court’s ruling that House District 75 passed 
the strict scrutiny test, and stated that the use of a BVAP number 
requires more than anecdotal testimony from a district’s incumbent 
representative. Throughout its analysis, the Court should also have 
been mindful of substantial policy considerations that weigh in favor of 
increased judicial oversight of blanket BVAP targets. 
I.  FACTS 
Following the 2010 census, the Virginia state legislature attempted 
to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia House of Delegates 
and the Virginia Senate.7 Delegate Chris Jones led the effort in 
redrawing the districts for the Virginia House.8 During the formulation 
of the new districting plan (“the 2011 plan”), the House Committee on 
Privileges and Elections adopted a resolution with the criteria that the 
committee would follow in evaluating redistricting plans—those 
criteria were: (1) population equality among the districts; (2) 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, in particular by protecting 
against retrogression or dilution of racial or ethnic minority voting 
strength; (3) contiguity and compactness of each district; (4) creating 
single-member districts; and (5) basing districting on factors that can 
create or contribute to communities of interest.9 The resolution 
provided that each of the five categories would be considered, but that 
population equality among districts and compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act would be given priority.10 
Since the Commonwealth of Virginia was a covered jurisdiction 
under the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) at the time the redistricting 
legislation was passed,11 any new districting plan had to comply with 
Section 5 of the VRA. This required that any new districting plan not 
result in a “retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect 
 
 6.  515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).  
 7.  Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 511 (E.D. Va. 2015).  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 518. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 511. 
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to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”12 Using the 
previous districting regime, which contained twelve majority-minority 
districts, as a benchmark in an attempt to comply with Section 5 of the 
VRA, Delegate Jones created a House plan with twelve majority-
minority districts—the twelve districts eventually challenged by 
Appellants.13 
Under the pre-existing districting plan, the twelve challenged 
districts had BVAPs between 46.3% and 62.7%.14 Under the 2011 plan, 
the BVAPs in the twelve majority-minority districts exceeded 55%,15 
ranging from 55.2% to 60.7%.16 The 55% BVAP figure was used 
expressly in drawing the twelve districts.17 Although testimony at trial 
was contradictory as to the source of the 55% BVAP floor, the district 
court found that the number was based on concerns relating to the re-
election of a delegate of one of the challenged districts and on feedback 
from three other delegates of challenged districts.18 
The redistricting plan was enacted into law when the Governor 
signed House Bill 5005 in April 2011.19 To comply with the commands 
of the VRA, Virginia submitted the enacted districting plan to the 
Department of Justice, which pre-cleared the plan in June 2011.20 The 
first election using the new districting plan was held on November 8, 
2011.21 
In December 2014, Respondents (twelve individual plaintiffs, each 
a citizen of one of the twelve districts) filed a complaint seeking 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief prohibiting the Virginia 
State Board of Elections from implementing the redistricting or from 
conducting further elections based on those districts.22 Respondents 
alleged that the twelve districts were racial gerrymanders in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.23 The case was heard by a three-judge 
 
 12.  Id. (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).  
 13.  Id. at 511–12. 
 14.  Id. at 519. 
 15.  Id. at 520. 
 16.  Brief for Appellants at 11, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 136 S. Ct. 2406 
(No. 15-680) (2016) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
 17.  Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 519. 
 18.  See id. at 522. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 512.  
 23.  Id.  
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district court panel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).24 The Virginia 
House of Delegates and Virginia Speaker of the House William Howell 
intervened.25 The case was heard by a three-judge panel for the Eastern 
District of Virginia in July 2015.26 
The three-judge panel rejected the plaintiffs’ claim and held that all 
twelve of the challenged districts satisfied the scrutiny of the Equal 
Protection Clause.27 It determined that predominance requires a 
showing of “actual conflict” between the use of race and other 
criteria.28 It determined that, under Alabama, evidence of BVAP 
threshold use suggested, but did not prove, racial predominance.29 
To evaluate racial predominance, the majority examined, district by 
district, circumstantial evidence of compliance with traditional, neutral-
districting criteria, including the following: contiguity, compactness, 
existing political subdivisions, natural geography, “nesting,” precinct 
locations, communities of interest, and state criteria.30 It held that the 
plaintiffs had proven that race was the predominant factor in the 
formation of only one of the twelve challenged districts—House 
District 75.31 Applying a strict scrutiny test to the formation of House 
District 75, the majority held that Virginia’s interest in compliance with 
the VRA was a compelling interest at the time the 2011 plan was 
enacted.32 Finding that there was a “strong basis in evidence” for the 
use of race in drawing the districts, the majority concluded that the 
predominant use of race was narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
governmental interest.33 The majority ultimately held that each of the 
twelve challenged districts withstood the Equal Protection Clause 
challenge and found for defendants.34 
 
 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 571 (E.D. Va. 2015).  
 28.  Id. at 524.  
 29.  See id. at 532. (“Alabama . . . holds that racial thresholds constitute evidence, but not 
dispositive proof of, racial predominance.”). 
 30.  Id. at 535–39.  
 31.  Id. at 510–11.  
 32.  Id. at 547.  
 33.  See id. at 559 (holding that Virginia’s actual compliance with the Voting Rights Act 
constituted a compelling state interest at the time the redistricting plan was enacted, and that the 
action was narrowly tailored because there was a “good reason” for the legislature to believe that 
the BVAP percentage employed was necessary for compliance with the VRA). 
 34.  Id. at 571.  
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After the panel ruled in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs filed 
their notice of appeal on October 26, 2015.35 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on June 6, 2016.36 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Right to Vote and the Equal Protection Clause 
While the original Constitution did not explicitly protect the right 
to vote, subsequent amendments contained language indicating that 
such a right did exist.37 In 1964, the Supreme Court expressly stated that 
there was a right to vote in Wesberry v. Sanders.38 A contemporaneous 
decision, Reynolds v. Sims,39 established that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause required states to draw 
legislative districts in a way that equally weighed each citizen’s vote.40 
The Court famously declared “one person, one vote” in Gray v. 
Sanders,41 saying that a “conception of political equality” existed in the 
Constitution.42 
B.  Racial Gerrymandering 
Gerrymandering, or district-drawing done for partisan gain, that is 
based on race, triggers strict scrutiny review. In Alabama Legislative 
Black Caucus v. Alabama,43 the Court held that strict scrutiny applies if 
race was the “predominant” consideration in deciding to place a 
 
 35.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 16, at 1. 
 36.  Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 136 S. Ct. 2406 (2016). 
 37.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); id. 
amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . 
on account of sex.”); id. amend. XXIV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote . . . 
shall not be denied or abridged . . . by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); id. 
amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The rights of the citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age 
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of age.”).  
 38.  See 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964) ( “No right is more precious in a free country than that of 
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws . . . [o]ther rights, even the most basic, 
are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification 
of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right.”).  
 39.  377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 40.  See id. at 568 (holding that seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be 
apportioned by population).  
 41.  372 U.S. 368 (1963) (holding that a state’s county unit system which, while giving every 
qualified voter in a statewide election one vote, employed system which in end result weighted 
rural votes more heavily than urban votes, and weighted some smaller rural counties heavier than 
other large rural counties, violated, inter alia, the Equal Protection Clause). 
 42.  See id. at 381. 
 43.  135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).  
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significant number of voters within or without a given district.44 In 
Miller v. Johnson,45 the Court said that race predominates if the 
legislature “subordinated traditional race-neutral districting 
principles” to racial considerations.46 These traditional districting 
principles include, but are not limited to, district compactness, district 
contiguity, and respect for current political subdivisions or 
communities.47 An equal population goal is not a factor to consider in 
a predominance analysis, but instead is in the background of the 
redistricting process.48 Evidence of racial predomination may be either 
circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics, or 
direct evidence of legislative purpose.49 
If race predominated in the drawing of district lines, a state must 
show that the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.50 Where VRA compliance is cited as a 
compelling interest, the legislature must have a “strong basis in 
evidence” for the use of race.51 
C.  The Voting Rights Act 
Section 5 of the VRA required that a state prove that its new district 
lines do not cause a “retrogression in the position of racial minorities 
with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”52 The 
Supreme Court said in Alabama that Section 5 of the VRA requires a 
state to ensure that minority voters “retain the ability to elect their 
preferred candidates,” but not necessarily maintain the same 
population percentages in majority-minority districts as the prior 
districting plan.53 The Court held that the coverage formula in Section 
4b of the VRA is unconstitutional in 2013.54 
Taking into account the dueling requirements of the VRA and the 
Equal Protection Clause, a state such as Virginia must consider race in 
drawing legislative districts in order to devise a plan complying with 
 
 44.  Id. at 1264. 
 45.  515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 46.  Id. at 916.  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1270.  
 49.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. 
 50.  Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1262 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907–08 (1996)).  
 51.  Id. at 1274.  
 52.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 906 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).  
 53.  Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1273.  
 54.  Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).  
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Section 5 of the VRA55—but at the same time a state cannot 
subordinate traditional, race-neutral principles of district-drawing to 
racial considerations in drawing the district boundaries.56 
III.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Petitioners’ Arguments 
Petitioners argue that the “actual conflict” standard used by the 
lower court is incorrect—since the standard for racial predominance 
under Miller and Alabama is merely that the legislature prioritizes race 
above traditional districting principles, there is no need to show any 
actual conflict between those principles and race.57 According to 
Petitioners, by disregarding direct evidence, such as statements by 
Delegate Jones as to the importance of the BVAP percentage and 
official criteria indicating that compliance with the VRA was a 
priority,58 the lower court ignores Supreme Court statements that racial 
targets (such as a BVAP percentage) were “strong, perhaps 
overwhelming evidence” of racial predomination.59 Petitioners then 
argue that the majority “systematically disregarded” the role of race in 
the legislature’s decision to structure each individual district.60 
Petitioners contend that the direct evidence that Respondent had 
prioritized the 55% BVAP percentage, together with circumstantial 
evidence of race-based districts, proved racial predominance and 
merited strict scrutiny.61 According to Petitioners, the lower court either 
ignored such evidence or failed to give it the proper weight under 
Alabama.62 
Petitioners contend that none of the twelve challenged districts 
would satisfy strict scrutiny.63 Petitioners argue first that the lower court 
used an incorrect legal framework in addressing whether the use of race 
 
 55.  See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (stating that the VRA requires that any proposed change not 
result in the retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their electoral 
franchise).  
 56.  See id. (stating that plaintiffs in a racial gerrymandering case must show that the 
legislature subordinated traditional criteria to racial considerations). 
 57.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 16, at 16.  
 58.  Id. at 20–29. 
 59.  Id. at 12 (quoting Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1263, 1267, 1271 
(2015)).  
 60.  See id. at 30–56 (discussing each of the twelve districts individually). 
 61.  Id. at 9.  
 62.  Id. at 12. 
 63.  Id. at 59. 
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in drawing House District 75 was narrowly tailored to avoid 
retrogression. Instead of simply asking whether the legislature had a 
“strong basis in evidence” for using race, the majority invented a wholly 
new standard, which required showing whether a legislature could 
reasonably believe that deviations were not substantial.64 Second, 
Petitioners argue that the lower court erred in finding that the only 
“strong basis” for using the BVAP figure was testimony from the 
representative of HD 75, advocating for more minority voters so that 
they could elect a candidate of their choice—an insufficient interest, 
according to Petitioners, to satisfy strict scrutiny.65 
B.  Respondents’ Arguments 
Respondents argue that the district court panel correctly assessed 
predominance, based on language in Alabama stating that strict 
scrutiny should apply only if Petitioners prove that BVAP targets had 
a “direct and significant” impact on the lines as drawn.66 Respondents 
concede that a BVAP target can be evidence of race-based decision-
making, but state that, under Alabama, predominance turns on whether 
a legislature neglected other districting principles in order to achieve a 
racial goal.67 
Respondents argue that while the Court in Alabama treated the use 
of BVAP targets as evidence of race-conscious decisions, it did not hold 
that the use of a BVAP target necessarily merited strict scrutiny.68 
Respondents also argue that a BVAP target is not even necessarily 
strong evidence of race-based decision-making, as such a target could 
be consistent with other traditional districting principles.69 
Respondents also argue that the use of the BVAP percentage in 
drawing HD 75 was narrowly tailored, as it satisfies strict scrutiny for 
legislators to have had “good reasons” with “a strong basis in evidence” 
to make the race-based decision;70 they additionally argue that there 
were good reasons to believe that maintaining a 55%+ BVAP was 
necessary to prevent minority retrogression.71 They also emphasize 
 
 64.  Id. at 56–57 (quoting Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1274). 
 65.  Id. at 57–58. 
 66.  Brief for Appellees at 20, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 136 S. Ct. 2406 (No. 
15-680) (2016) (quoting Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1271) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents]. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 22–23. 
 70.  Id. at 51 (quoting Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1273). 
 71.  Id. at 54. 
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Delegate Jones’ functional analysis, using metrics such as census data, 
voter registration, and meetings with delegates, to argue that requiring 
any more from the legislature would create a demanding standard and 
a burden on states.72 
IV.  HOLDING 
The Supreme Court announced its decision in Bethune-Hill v. 
Virginia Board of Elections on March 1, 2017.73 The Court agreed with 
Petitioners that the “actual conflict” standard used by the district court 
was incorrect.74 The Court stated that “a conflict or inconsistency 
between the enacted plan and traditional redistricting criteria is not a 
threshold requirement or mandatory precondition in order to establish 
a claim of racial gerrymandering” – though it also stated that such a 
conflict or inconsistency could be persuasive evidence of racial 
predomination.75 The Court also agreed with Petitioners that the 
district court gave insufficient weight to the 55% BVAP target and 
other evidence of racial predominance.76 However, the Court declined 
the opportunity to hold that race predominated in the eleven districts, 
stating that the district court is best suited to determine racial 
predomination and, if race did predominate, to perform strict scrutiny 
analysis.77 It vacated the district court’s ruling with respect to eleven of 
the twelve challenged districts and remanded the case to the lower 
court.78 With respect to House District 75, the Court affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling that the district survived strict scrutiny, holding that the 
functional analysis done by Delegate Jones showed that the legislature 
had a strong basis in evidence to believe that a 55% BVAP floor was 
necessary to prevent retrogression under Section 5 of the VRA.79 
V.  ANALYSIS 
This case provided the Court with an opportunity to review the 
application of the Alabama/Miller standard for racial predominance. 
The Court rightly criticized the lower court’s use of an “actual conflict” 
standard for racial predominance. However, rather than simply 
 
 72.  Id. at 55. 
 73.  Bethune-Hill v. Va. Board of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017). 
 74.  Id. at 798.  
 75.  Id. at 799.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. at 800.  
 78.  Id. at 795.  
 79.  Id. at 801.  
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vacating the lower court’s decision and remanding, the Court should 
have gone further and held that the stated prioritization of the 55% 
BVAP percentage above all other criteria in the redistricting process 
showed that race predominated. Accordingly, the Court should have 
held that race predominated in the formation of all twelve challenged 
districts and remanded the case to the district court solely for strict 
scrutiny analysis on the eleven districts apart from House District 75. 
As to House District 75, the Court should also have vacated the lower 
court’s ruling that House District 75 passed strict scrutiny, and held that 
anecdotal testimony from a district’s incumbent representative is not a 
“strong basis in evidence” that a BVAP number is required. 
Throughout its analysis, the Court should also have been mindful of 
substantial policy considerations that weigh in favor of increased 
judicial oversight of blanket BVAP targets. 
A.  The BVAP Percentage as Used Here Satisfies the “Predominance” 
Test from Alabama and Miller 
The stated prioritization of the BVAP percentage clearly satisfies 
the racial predomination test from Alabama and Miller. Miller stated 
that race predominates if it subordinates all other criteria.80 Here, direct 
statements from Delegate Jones as well as officially adopted criteria for 
the redistricting process plainly indicate that the use of the BVAP 
percentage for VRA compliance predominated over all other 
districting criteria. The House resolution explicitly prioritized (1) equal 
population among districts and (2) VRA compliance; since Alabama 
has clarified that an equal population goal is not to be weighed as a 
factor but rather exists in the background, the adopted resolution 
indicates that VRA compliance was the predominant factor to be 
considered.81 In addition, statements by Delegate Jones, the architect 
of the enacted redistricting plan, that VRA compliance was “the most 
important thing” and that VRA compliance “trumped everything” 
clearly show that race predominated.82 There is no plainer evidence 
that race predominated in drawing districts than direct statements and 
adopted criteria that explicitly prioritize racial targets over other 
decision-making criteria. The Court has already said that blanket racial 
targets such as a fixed BVAP percentage are strong and perhaps 
 
 80.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).  
 81.  See Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2015).  
 82.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 16, at 26–27.  
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overwhelming evidence that race predominated.83 Here is such a case. 
Accordingly, the Court should have held that a stated prioritization of 
racial targets above all other criteria is racial “predominance” and 
triggers strict scrutiny. 
B.  A “Strong Basis in Evidence” for the Use of a Fixed Racial 
Threshold for VRA Compliance Requires More Than Anecdotal 
Testimony from a District’s Representative 
As to the strict scrutiny analysis, the Court should have held that a 
“strong basis in evidence” for the use of race requires more than 
anecdotal conversations with incumbent representatives. The Court has 
previously required that a demanding standard be met for the 
government to classify based on race. In City of Richmond v. Croson,84 
the Court held that findings including testimony from community 
leaders and statistical evidence about discrepancies in minority 
contractor representation were insufficient to provide a strong basis in 
evidence that a 30% minority quota was necessary.85 Here, the district 
court seemed to think that conversations with incumbent 
representatives, together with census data, were sufficient to justify the 
55% BVAP figure. The Court should have held that this is not the case 
and order the district court to be more demanding in its strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
C.  Substantial Policy Considerations Weigh in Favor of Judicial 
Oversight 
Finally, the Court should have been mindful that are also 
substantial policy considerations in play: the dilution of minority power 
in state legislatures and Congress by “packing” minority voters into a 
smaller number of districts and an increase in partisan gridlock due to 
gerrymandering merit increased scrutiny in gerrymandering cases 
when race is a priority in district-drawing. 
The first policy consideration is that gerrymandering, intended to 
increase the share of minority voters in a given district, can have the 
effect of diluting minority power in a legislature.86 By mandating that a 
 
 83.  Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1263 (2015).  
 84.  488 U.S. 469 (1989).  
 85.  Id. at 499–500. 
 86.  See Kim Soffen, How Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black People of Political Power, 
WASH. POST (June 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp /2016/06/09/how-a-
widespread-practice-to-politically-empower-african-americans-might-actually-harm-
them/?utm_term=.507509fa05c0. 
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district have a certain percentage of minority voters, a legislature can 
effectively dilute the power of minority voters by consolidating them 
into fewer districts.87 Such practices can undermine any intended effect 
to increase minority representation in positions of political influence, 
and runs afoul of the Court’s long-held belief in a “conception of 
political equality” within the Constitution,88 warranting closer attention 
to gerrymandering based on race. 
The second policy consideration is that racial gerrymandering can 
have the effect of polarizing statehouses and Congress itself, leading to 
increased gridlock and a dysfunctional political system. In many states 
race, while not a perfect proxy for party affiliation, is highly correlated 
with it.89 Any attempt to “pack” minority voters into certain districts 
likely results in more “safe” electoral districts for each party, which 
could lead to an entrenchment of partisan gridlock, as there is no 
electoral incentive for representatives to moderate or cooperate with 
the other side. Such institutionalized polarization undermines the 
norms of cooperation and collaboration necessary for a functional 
representative democracy. The Court should have been mindful of 
these policy objectives when making its decision.  
CONCLUSION  
This case was yet another in a long line of redistricting cases. The 
Court did well to clarify the test for racial predominance – but should 
have held that the facts of this case satisfy the test. Accordingly, it 
should have held that race predominated in all twelve districts. As to 
the strict scrutiny analysis, it should also have demanded a higher 
standard for a “strong basis in evidence” that the 55% BVAP was 
needed. Additionally, in order to protect the rights of minority groups 
and guard against political polarization and gridlock, the Court should 
have placed a stronger limit on racial gerrymandering. 
 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
 89.  See Election 2016 Exit Polls, Virginia–President, CNN (Nov. 9, 2016) http://www.cnn.com 
/election/results/exit-polls/virginia/president. 
